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ABSTRACT
Objective: Implementation of a surgical checklist
depends on many organisational factors and on socio-
cultural patterns. The objective of this study was to
identify barriers to effective implementation of
a surgical checklist and to develop a best use strategy.
Setting: 18 cancer centres in France.
Design: The authors ﬁrst assessed use compliance and
completeness rates of the surgical checklist on
a random sample of 80 surgical procedures performed
under general or loco-regional anaesthesia in each of
the 18 centres. They then developed a typology of the
organisational and cultural barriers to effective
checklist implementation and deﬁned each barrier’s
contents using data from collective and semi-
structured individual interviews of key staff, the results
of an email questionnaire sent to the 18 centres, and
direct observations over 20 h in two centres.
Results: The study consisted of 1440 surgical
procedures, 1299 checklists, and 28578 items. The
mean compliance rate was 90.2% (0, 100). The mean
completion rate was 61% (0, 84). 11 barriers to
effective checklist implementation were identiﬁed.
Their incidence varied widely across centres. The main
barriers were duplication of items within existing
checklists (16/18 centres), poor communication
between surgeon and anaesthetist (10/18), time spent
completing the checklist for no perceived beneﬁt, and
lack of understanding and timing of item checks (9/
18), ambiguity (8/18), unaccounted risks (7/18) and
a time-honoured hierarchy (6/18).
Conclusions: Several of the barriers to the successful
implementation of the surgical checklist depended on
organisational and cultural factors within each centre.
The authors propose a strategy for change for
checklist design, use and assessment, which could be
used to construct a feedback loop for local team
organisation and national initiatives.
INTRODUCTION
Since the development of checklists for use in
operating rooms by the WHO in 2008, their
use has become increasingly widespread and
seems to be associated with a signiﬁcant
decrease in postoperative complications and
mortality rates.
1e4 Recently, however, ques-
tions have arisen about their ease of intro-
duction into workﬂow patterns and their true
impact on safety.
56These aspects require
both high physician commitment and an
ability to capture the work organisation.
78
Thus, even if surgical checklists are widely
used, proactive management of the organisa-
tional changes required is indispensable for
use to be effective and enduring.
In January 2010, the French National
Authority for Health (Haute Autorite ´d e
Sante ´, HAS), in collaboration with profes-
sional colleges, introduced a modiﬁed
version of the WHO surgical checklist for
which it provided training sessions, written
materials and videos.
9 This mandatory
checklist has 22 items covering three time-
frames: before anaesthesia (‘sign in’) (nine
items), before skin incision (‘time out’)
(eight items), and before leaving the oper-
ating room (‘sign out’) (ﬁve items)
(ﬁgure 1). However, at a national meeting
6 months after the checklist was introduced,
a representative of the French Society of
Anaesthesia and Intensive Care declared
that ‘bureaucratic use’ of the checklist was
of no beneﬁt and might even have a nega-
tive impact, and that health professionals
should take organisational factors into
account.
The objective of this study was threefold: to
assess the use compliance and completeness
rates of surgical checklists in cancer centres;
to identify and compare barriers to effective
use in these centres; and to develop a strategy
for effective use. A barrier was deﬁned as
a work situation causing problems involving
organisational rules, human skills, cultural
features and beliefs.
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Original researchMETHODS
Setting
The study was initiated in October 2009 by the French
National Federation of Cancer Centres (FNCLCC), in
collaboration with a research team specialising in
healthcare management (COMPAQH, Coordination for
Measuring Performance and Assuring Quality of Hospi-
tals, Institut Gustave Roussy). It included 18 (out of 20)
centres which were implementing the mandatory
checklist. These 18 centres performed 40620 surgical
procedures in 2009.
Measurement of use compliance and checklist
completeness
The study included measurements of surgical procedures
performed under general or loco-regional anaesthesia
between 11 and 29 January 2010. Cases of topical anaes-
thesia, interventional radiology, gastro-intestinal endoscopy
and central venous catheter implantation were excluded.
Checklists were kept as part of each patient’s medical
record. However, as medical records were not completely
computerised, checklist data could not be extracted
automatically. A random sample of 80 records from each
centre was analysed. This sample size was also based on
published studies.
10 11 Individual scores were calculated
for each sample and the 18 participating centres were
ranked into three categories (top, middle and bottom).
Deﬁnition of the categories was based on the degree to
which the 95% CIs did or did not overlap the mean
score. The method used partly features the Hospital
Report Research Collaborative method. This method is
fairer than simple ranking and accounts for uncertainty
in the scores.
12
The method used in this study had three categories
and one CIdthe 95% CI, whereas the Hospital Report
Research Collaborative method had two CIsd90% and
99% CIs. For each centre, the compliance rate was the
percentage of checklists found in the 80 patients’
medical records. The mean compliance rate was calcu-
lated as the sum of the compliance rates for each centre
divided by the number of centres.
For each centre, the completeness rate was the
percentage of complete checklists found in the 80
Figure 1 Surgical safety checklist published by the French National Authority for Health (HAS) (January 2010 version*). An
updated version was published in January 2011.
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Original researchpatients’ medical records. A complete checklist is
a checklist in which all items have been ticked. The
mean completeness rate was calculated as the sum of the
completeness rates for each centre divided by the
number of centres.
Analysis of barriers to effective checklist use
To identify barriers to effective checklist use and for
good internal validity, data were collected in three ways
(collective and individual interviews, an email ques-
tionnaire sent to surgical staff and direct observations),
and the results triangulated. First, two researchers (AF
and EM) collectively interviewed voluntary staff in 16 of
the 18 centres about the beneﬁts and drawbacks of
checklist implementation during a 3 h session. Four
surgeons, three anaesthetists, two nurses, six senior
nurses and one quality manager took part in this
collective interview. Then, eight other key surgical staff
from different centres (two surgeons, three anaesthe-
tists and three senior nurses) were scheduled for indi-
vidual interviews using as substrate a semi-structured
questionnaire (25 questions) based on the results of the
collective interview. A ninth person, a surgeon,
declined the interview because of a full agenda. All
eight individual interviews were conducted by the same
researcher (AF) to ensure that a similar emphasis was
g i v e nt oe a c hq u e s t i o ni ne a c hi n t e r v i e wa n dt h a tt h e
meaning and importance ascribed to each barrier was
explicit. The interviews lasted 30 min on average.
Second, to capture a collective perspective, a contact
person in each centre was sent an email questionnaire
consisting of 25 questions plus ﬁve questions on further
barriers brought up by the interviewees. This email
questionnaire was piloted for clarity at the Institut
Gustave Roussy and took about 10 min to complete. All
centres returned the questionnaire. In most cases, it was
completed by operating room staff but sometimes by
quality department staff. Lastly, a researcher (AF or
EM) made direct observations on all the barriers that
had cropped up during the interviews and in the
completed questionnaires. These observations were
m a d eo v e r2 0hi nt w oc e n t r e s ,o n ew i t hal o w( 5 2 % )
and one with a high (84%) proportion of complete
checklists.
Two researchers (AF and EM) processed and
compared the data from the interviews, email question-
naire, and direct observations. Data were categorised as
follows. Axial coding was used to relate responses and
create a typology of the barriers hindering effective
checklist use. A ﬁrst typology was created after the
collective interview. It was revised twice, ﬁrst after addi-
tion of the data from the individual interviews and then
after addition of the data from the questionnaires.
Vertical coding was used to better deﬁne the content of
each barrier. Dependency chains were sought to distin-
guish data related to missing checklist items and data
related to barriers.
13 The content of each barrier was
deﬁned after the interviews and ﬁne-tuned after the
return of the questionnaires and after making direct
observations, using the revised typology. The typology
and barrier contents were discussed and validated by the
staff who had participated in the collective interview, on
the basis of their working experience, during a second 3
h session during which discrepancies were resolved and
minor adjustments were made.
RESULTS
Compliance of use and checklist completeness
The analysis included 1440 surgical procedures (80 per
centre). Overall, 1299 checklists were handed in and
28578 items were analysed. The mean compliance rate
was 90.2% (range 0e100) and the mean completeness
rate was 61% (range 0e84) (ﬁgure 2). The 0% score was
allocated to a centre unable to retrieve proof that the
medical reports had been checked. The median
compliance rate was 98.75 and the median completeness
rate was 66.25. For the ﬁrst quartile, the compliance rate
was 92.50 and the completeness rate was 52.81. The
values for the third quartile were 99.69 and 79.38,
respectively. Most missing items (47%) occurred during
‘sign out’ (table 1).
Barrier typology
Eleven barriers to effective checklist implementation
were identiﬁed. Their frequency, as judged from the
answers to the email questionnaire, is given in
decreasing rank order, with an example of content taken
from the individual and collective interviews and/or
from direct observations (table 2). Other elements of
content support some key aspects of each barrier.
The most common barrier (16 centres) was duplica-
tion with existing processes that already covered several
of the items in the surgical checklist. For example,
checking patient identity, accounting for sponges or
adverse events reporting were already carried out before
the use of the checklist, as procedures and documents
existed for those examples. For adverse events reporting,
an electronic system was also used in most of the centres.
Therefore there was duplication in documents for
reporting these events.
The next most common barrier (10 centres) was lack
of communication between the surgeon and the anaes-
thetist at the end of the surgical procedure. The surgeon
might leave the centre before ‘sign out’ and the anaes-
thetist might return during recovery after skin closure.
This jeopardised the sharing of information on patient
management.
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long to complete as they already had a heavy workload,
and did not perceive the added beneﬁt. According to
one surgeon, ‘the checklist could generate delays and
conﬂicts’. High staff turnover, especially of nurses, in
nine centres was also considered an obstacle to checklist
implementation despite provision of training. In nine
centres, some items did not make sense because they did
not ﬁt in with customary operating room practices (eg,
needle counts after disposal) or because their timing was
inappropriate.
The binary (yes/no) response system was ambiguous
and confusing according to eight centres, that is, could
a non-‘yes’ answer prevent moving on to the next ques-
tion and postpone surgery? Seven centres reported risks
that were not prevented by application of the checklist,
even if it were fully completed (for example, thrombo-
embolism, contamination and viral risk (HIV, HCV,
HBV)). Staff in six centres had communication prob-
lems during checks. According to the nursing staff
completing the checklist, the surgeons and anaesthetists
who were ultimately responsible for the surgical proce-
dure did not always listen to the items when they were
read out. Nurses were therefore concerned about the
legal implications of signing the checklist as they might
be held accountable for errors. In ﬁve centres, staff
thought that repeating questions that had already been
answered several times might generate anxiety in
patients about to undergo anaesthesia but this was not
supported by direct observation. Five centres reported
that items could be ticked off even when items were not
checked because of time constraints. Items were ticked
only to comply with the management audit; therefore, in
this situation, checklists failed to improve patient safety.
However, during the 20 h of observation in two
hospitals, many items were left unchecked or answers
Figure 2 Rates of compliance of
use (A) and completeness (B)
recorded for the surgical checklist.
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Original researchgiven by the wrong person but there were no instances of
items being ticked off without actually checking the item
at the beginning of the surgical procedure or at the end.
Variability between centres
Checklist use was compared by direct observation in two
centres with similar case mixes but with different
compliance rates (100% and 92.5%) and completeness
rates (84% and 52%). In the centre with poor results,
several staff members had not been involved in checklist
implementation. Many items were not checked. The
head surgeon in this centre had attended the training
session but considered ‘administrative tools’ unsuited to
assessing his ﬁeld of work. He was therefore against using
the checklist. His staff thought that the measurements
that the anaesthetist, who was working on the centre’s
information systems, had made using the checklist were
‘boring’ and irrelevant to just-in-time management.
DISCUSSION
Mean compliance with mandatory checklist use was high
(90.2%) at introduction but far short of the desired
100% score. The mean percentage of complete check-
lists was relatively low (61%; range 0e84%), indicating
that hospital staff encountered problems with imple-
mentation after checklist adoption. These results
support those for the SURPASS checklist for which the
completion rate was about 80% for most items but less
than 30% for others.
2
Eleven organisational barriers to implementation were
identiﬁed and several of those already identiﬁed, such as
poor communication between the anaesthetist and
surgeon, lack of leadership, inappropriate timing for
checking an item, time taken up by checklist comple-
tion, and difﬁculty in identifying the role and responsi-
bility of each staff member, were conﬁrmed.
6e8 14
Table 1 Frequency of missing items
Item
Number of
times missing % Min (%) Max (%)
Sign in
1. Patient identity 7 0.54 0 2.5
2. Procedure and operation site conﬁrmed 12 0.93 0 3.75
3. Clinical and paraclinical information required
available in operating room
74 5.71 0 52.5
4. Patient positioning 16 1.23 0 5
5. Surgical equipment required 34 2.62 0 13.75
6. Anaesthesia equipment required 38 2.93 0 12.5
7. Patient allergies 19 1.46 0 5
8. Risks of inhalation, difﬁculties of intubation or
mask ventilation
32 2.47 0 6.25
9. Signiﬁcant risk of bleeding 68 5.24 0 41.25
Total 300 22.59
Time in (cross-checking) 29.45
10. Patient identity correct 30 2.31 0 13.75
11. Planned procedure conﬁrmed 35 2.70 0 13.75
12. Operation site identiﬁed 35 2.70 0 13.75
13. Patient position correct 37 2.85 0 13.75
14. Documents required available 65 5.01 0 32.5
15. Surgical information shared 67 5.17 0 18.75
16. Anaesthesia information shared 51 3.93 0 11.25
17. Antibiotic prophylaxis given 62 4.78 0 15
Total 382 22.59
Sign out (verbal conﬁrmation)
18. Procedure recorded 97 7.48 0 23.75
19. Instrument, swab and needle counts correct 118 9.10 2 26.25
20. Specimens and samples correctly labelled 103 7.94 0 26.25
21. Problems with equipment and adverse events
reported
143 11.03 0 33.75
22. Postoperative orders drawn up jointly by
surgeon and anaesthetist
154 11.87 0 41.25
Total 615 47.42
Grand total 1297 100.00
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Original researchHowever, these results should not overly dampen
enthusiasm and prevent use of the checklist as a ‘short,
uncluttered by noncritical items, and carefully worded’
reminder of key actions.
8
Two main reasons might explain the barriers identi-
ﬁed. The ﬁrst relates to work organisation. A checklist is
often put across as a tool to enhance communication
and as a reminder in stressful circumstances but, like
other operational tools, it impacts on the organisation of
work.
8 15 Organisational changes are needed while
implementing a surgical checklist in operating rooms,
for example, harmonisation with existing adverse-event
reporting systems and allocating the time needed to
complete the checklist, communicate it, and check that
it is complete. The second reason relates to professional
relationships and cultural habits in clinical practice.
Verbal communication between health professionals
(surgeons, anaesthetists and nurses) has to be egalitarian
for checklist use to be effective but the ﬁndings suggest
that operating room staff practices are rooted in
a time-honoured hierarchy, at least in France.
The number of unchecked items varied widely across
centres, and was probably a reﬂection of the usual
behaviour of the surgical team and of the ‘sense’ they
made of the checklist.
14 Operational tools uncoupled
from operational activities because they lack ‘sense’ may
fall short of the expected level of use or induce unde-
sirable practices such as inhibition in care practice or
gaming.
16e19 Any strategy for organisational changes to
be made on checklist introduction should therefore
take into account the cultural maturity and history of
operating room staff.
The ﬁndings of this study have practical implications
for the design (areas of applicability), use (local
contexts) and assessment of checklists by national health
authorities. Checklist design should account for the
organisational constraints to which the activity is subject.
Clarity is also essential. HAS added the option ‘Not
Applicable’ to the ‘Yes/No’ boxes of most checklist items
in May 2010 and included all 11 barriers in their
checklist’s guideline to improve checklist use. As for all
quality improvement measures, each centre should
develop its own strategy for work organisation as indi-
cated by the wide variation in checklist implementation
across centres.
20 For example, one cancer centre laid
down ﬁve ways of improving surgeoneanaesthetist
communication on peroperative risks, which was one of
the most important barriers identiﬁed. In line with
Parand et al’s view that the priorities and concerns of
surgeons are paramount, the surgeons and anaesthetists
of this centre listed unexpected events, entered these
events into a common thesaurus, set up an alert system
for staff outside the operating room, made the presence
of the anaesthetist compulsory at the end of each
surgical procedure in order to share information on
drug prescriptions, and asked for regular feedback on
Table 2 Frequency of occurrence of 11 barriers with illustrative examples
Barrier
Centres
(out of 18) Illustrative examples
Duplication with existing checks 16 Checking patient identity, accounting for sponges
and adverse event reporting
Poor communication between
anaesthetist and surgeon
10 Did not always use the same document to record
postoperative orders during ‘sign out’
Time consuming 9 Checklist too long to complete, especially when very
busy (eg, emergency surgery, end of day)
Does not make sense 9 Staff in some operating rooms are not accustomed to
count needles and this may not even be possible after
disposal into appropriate containers during surgery to
avoid injury
Inappropriate timing 9 Difﬁcult to check sample labelling at the end of the
procedure if the samples were sent to the pathology
laboratory during surgery
Ambiguity 8 Did a ‘yes’ response for ‘allergies’ mean that the patient
had an allergy or that the risk of allergy had been checked
Unaccounted risks 7 Checklist did not cover skin preparation and postoperative
prevention of pain or vomiting
Oral conﬁrmation of items 6 Reading out the entire list was found unnecessary
Identiﬁcation of the role and
responsibility of staff
6 Direct observation had difﬁculty in identifying the person
implementing the checklist during emergency and/or short
procedures as all staff were totally engrossed in their task
Patients’ attitude to questions 5 Asking the patient his or her name three times over a very
short time may cause alarm
Gaming 5 Ticking off unchecked items at the end of the day
196 BMJ Qual Saf 2012;21:191e197. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2011-000094
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7 At the close of the present study, the working
group formed by the members of staff taking part in the
collective interview developed a formal assessment plan
with the support of the national Cancer Centre Federa-
tion. This plan included feedback from centres on how
they dealt with the 11 barriers with a view to sharing of
experiences, longitudinal follow-up of compliance and
completeness, longitudinal measurement of a list of
complications (to be drawn up in 2011) in order to
include perioperative safety, and a yearly questionnaire
assessing the cultural maturity of each centre.
This study has several limitations: The announcement
by HAS that the checklist was mandatory may have
resulted in high staff motivation and overestimation of
checklist use (both compliance and completeness).
Overestimation may also have arisen from the presence
of an external observer (Hawthorne effect). However,
completeness may have been underestimated as, despite
training, staff were still relatively unfamiliar with the
checklist. The staff members taking part in the collective
interview were a source of data but were also involved in
the validation of the analysis performed by the
researchers. This may have led to some bias in inter-
preting the results, although discrepancies with the
researchers’ analysis were resolved by discussion and led
to only minor adjustments. Lastly, situations such as
interventional radiology and local anaesthesia were
excluded. Whether the ﬁndings on surgery in cancer
centres can be generalised to other types of surgery in
other settings requires further analysis.
In conclusion, before considering the impact of
a surgical checklist on safety, it is necessary to consider its
adoption by staff and to highlight the barriers to effec-
tive use. Consideration should be given to tailoring
checklists to services and areas with different needs (eg,
the lab specimen labelling example) and/or education
about items that are new but still considered important
by the proponents of the checklist (eg, the needles
examples). The strategy for change described in this
study could be used to construct a feedback loop for
local team organisation and national initiatives.
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